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INTRODUCTION
A novel coronavirus (“SARS-CoV-2”) began circulating late in 2019, and the World
Health Organization (“WHO”) declared a pandemic in March 2020.1 In response to the public
health threat the pandemic presented, some states within the United States implemented travel
restrictions, typically through executive orders issued by state governors. The term “travel
restriction” as used by the states refers to conditions of entry, such as testing, vaccination, or
quarantine requirements. Since these are not restrictions on travel, for the purposes of this paper
the term “travel condition” is used to more accurately refer to the conditions states imposed on
travelers or residents entering from out-of-state.
The issue presented by such travel conditions is whether they are: 1) constitutional
exercises of state police powers; or 2) good public policy for managing the public health
emergency. While there were some legal challenges to these travel conditions, they failed due to
lack of standing by the plaintiff, deference to the state governor or health official’s exercise of
state police powers in public health emergencies, or both. Although these legal challenges failed
on constitutional grounds, there are still public policy reasons for states to reconsider their use of
travel conditions. Principally, the travel conditions likely are not effective due to the nature of
SARS-CoV-2, which can be transmitted by asymptomatic individuals, and can take up to
fourteen days to cause the illness known as COVID-19. Based on asymptomatic carriers and a
long incubation period, by the time a case is identified in a state, the virus could have been
circulating in the population for at least fourteen days. At that point a travel condition is akin to
closing the barn door after the horse has already escaped.
This paper focuses on the state-level travel conditions imposed in the United States. For

WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 – 11 March 2020, WORLD H EALTH
ORGANIZATION (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-sopening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020.
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the purposes of comparing travel conditions, SARS-CoV-2 cases, and COVID-19 deaths, this
paper assesses two state pairings based on their similarity in population characteristics: New
York and Florida; and California and Texas. Part I begins with an assessment of the legal issues
including: an overview of travel conditions in the selected states in Section A; a review of the
legal framework for evaluating the constitutionality of travel conditions in Section B; and an
application of the legal framework to two cases in Section C. Part II assesses the public policy
considerations of state-based travel conditions, beginning with a review of the reasons for travel
conditions in Section A, an assessment of the costs versus benefits of travel conditions in Section
B, and a conclusion in Section C that travel conditions are likely not a preferred public policy
based on the attributes of SARS-CoV-2. Part III continues the public policy assessment of the
travel conditions with a comparison of travel conditions used and case count and death statistics
for four states: Section A compares New York and Florida; Section B compares California and
Texas. These state comparison-pairs have similar population characteristics but applied different
travel condition policies.
Based on the data available, even though state-level travel conditions are likely
constitutional, they are likely not good public policy tools for diseases like SARS-CoV-2, and
likely did not have a discernable effect on case counts or death rates. Additional epidemiological
research should be conducted to determine what role, if any, travel conditions may have played
in reducing case counts or death rates.
PART I: LEGAL ANALYSIS
States have a history of broad police powers during public health emergencies dating
back to the 1900s. Coupled with a deference to state police powers, during the SARS-CoV-2
pandemic, states structured their travel conditions such that they are not travel “bans” but are
instead quarantine or testing conditions for entry. These travel conditions do not ban out-of-state
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visitors, making it difficult for plaintiffs to establish standing. While there is a Fourteenth
Amendment right to travel, under the deference of Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
states showed that the travel conditions were necessary based on the public health emergency.
Courts focused their review on the unknown characteristics of SARS-CoV-2, the lack of a
vaccine against the virus, and the lack of an effective treatment for the illness COVID-19. This
could open a potential avenue for new claims now that we are more than twelve months into the
pandemic: multiple vaccines are now available for use, and the characteristics of SARS-CoV-2
transmission and the treatment of COVID-19 are better understood. In this evolving
environment, a challenge on constitutional grounds may now have a better chance of success.
This Part I focuses on the legal analysis of the travel conditions. Section A reviews the
travel conditions in the selected states: New York, Florida, California, and Texas. Section B
outlines the legal framework for evaluating the constitutionality of the travel conditions,
specifically: i) state police powers; ii) individuals’ right to travel; iii) standing; and iv) the
dormant commerce clause. Section C applies the framework outlined in Section B to two cases,
Bayley’s Campground, Inv. v. Mills and Carmichael v. Ige.
A.

Issue: Overview of Travel Conditions in Selected States (New York/Florida and

California/Texas)
In early 2020 SARS-CoV-2 arrived in the United States.2 Some states implemented travel
conditions in response to the spread of the virus and the illness it caused. These travel conditions
evolved during the pandemic, and continue to evolve at the time of this paper’s submission in
May 2021. This section provides an overview of when and how New York, Florida, California,
and Texas implemented travel conditions, and how these conditions evolved up to May 2021.

2

Eric Schumaker, Timeline: How coronavirus got started, ABCNEWS (Sept. 22, 2020, 11:55AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-coronavirus-started/story?id=69435165
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New York reported its first SARS-CoV-2 case on March 1, 2020.3 Case counts
progressed rapidly and, on March 16, 2020, New York closed its schools statewide and
established a partnership with New Jersey and Connecticut. 4 On March 28, 2020 the CDC issued
a domestic travel advisory for New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. 5 New York soon
became the first epicenter of COVID-19 cases in the United States.6
However, during the time when New York experienced the peak of its outbreak, and was
an epicenter of COVID-19 cases in the United States, New York did not implement any travel
conditions for visitors.7 It was not until Phase 2 of its reopening schedule, June 24, 2020, that
New York, in conjunction with New Jersey and Connecticut, announced travel conditions for
visitors.8 Implementing travel conditions at the end of June 2020 meant that SARS-CoV-2 had
already been circulating in New York for four months or more. 9 Given such a delay, the travel
conditions would have only a minimal impact in reducing spread, since coronavirus was already
present and widely circulating in the state. Those conditions remained in place until April 10,
2021.10 Now “[a]symptomatic travelers entering New York . . . are no longer required to test or

Ben Axelson, Cornavirus timeline in NY: Here’s how Gov. Cuomo has responded to COVID-19 pandemic since
January, SYRACUSE.COM (Apr. 14, 2020, updated Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.syracuse.com/coronavirus/2020/04/coronavirus-timeline-in-ny-heres-how-gov-cuomo-has-respondedto-covid-19-pandemic-since-january.html.
4 Kevin Tampone, NY closing gyms, restaurant dining rooms, movie theaters, more starting tonight over
coronavirus, SYRACUSE .COM (Mar. 16, 2020, updated Apr. 23, 2020),
https://www.syracuse.com/coronavirus/2020/03/gyms-casinos-restaurants-more-in-ny-nj-ct-closing-tonight-overcoronavirus.html.
5 Media Statement, CDC, CDC Issues Domestic Travel Advisory for New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut (Mar.
28, 2020) https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s038-travel-advisory.html.
6 Corinne N. Thompson, PhD, et al., COVID-19 Outbreak – New York City, February 29-June 1, 2020, MMWR
M ORB. M ORTAL . WKLY REP. 2020, 69:1725-29 (DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6946a2, also at
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6946a2.htm#:~:text=New%20York%20City%20(NYC)%20was,pan
demic%20in%20the%20United%20States.&text=Approximately%20203%2C000%20cases%20of%20laboratory,an
d%2032.1%25%20among%20hospitalized%20patients).
7 Alexandra Kerr, A Historical Timeline of COVID-19 in New York City, I NVESTOPEDIA (Updated Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/historical-timeline-of-covid-19-in-new-york-city-5071986.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 COVID-19 Travel Advisory, New York State COVID-19 Updates, https://coronavirus.health.ny.gov/covid-19travel-advisory (last accessed May 2, 2021).
3
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quarantine . . .”11
Like New York, Florida also reported its first SARS-CoV-2 case on March 1, 2020.12
Florida implemented travel conditions for visitors from states in the “epicenter”, such as New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, on March 23, 2020.13 The virus was circulating in Florida
for approximately one month prior to the implementation of travel conditions.14 This was five
days before the CDC issued its domestic travel advisory. 15 Florida moved into is reopening phase
in May 2020.16 On August 5, 2020, Florida lifted its travel conditions.17
California reported its first positive test for SARS-CoV-2 on January 25, 2020.18 It also
reported COVID-19 deaths of individuals who had not traveled internationally early in the
timeline, the first of whom first “became ill on January 31 and died on February 6 . . .” 19 This is
notable because this changed the infection timeline in the United States; prior to this information

11

Id. (emphasis in original).
Will Mullery and Janie Boschma, Timeline: How Florida’s coronavirus response compares to three other big
states, CNN (Updated May 4, 2020 at 6:10AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/04/politics/timeline-florida coronavirus/index.html.
13 See e.g. Exec. Order No. 20-80, Office of the Governor of the State of Florida (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-80.pdf (last accessed Mar. 15, 2021); Exec. Order
No. 20-82, Office of the Governor of the State of Florida (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-82.pdf (last accessed Mar. 15, 2021); Exec. Order No. 20-86, Office of the
Governor of the State of Florida (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_2086.pdf (last accessed Mar. 15, 2021); Exec. Order No. 20-139, Office of the Governor of the State of Florida (June.
3, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-139.pdf (last accessed Mar. 15, 2021); see
also, Adrienne Cutway, Timeline: The spread of coronavirus in Florida, CLICKORLANDO.COM (Sept. 25, 2020,
6:11PM), https://www.clickorlando.com/news/local/2020/03/20/timeline-the-spread-of-coronavirus-in-florida/.
14 Adrienne Cutway, Timeline: The spread of coronavirus in Florida, C LICKORLANDO.COM (Sept. 25, 2020,
6:11PM), https://www.clickorlando.com/news/local/2020/03/20/timeline-the-spread-of-coronavirus-in-florida/; see
also Exec. Order No. 20-80, Office of the Governor of the State of Florida (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-80.pdf (last accessed Mar. 15, 2021); Exec. Order
No. 20-82, Office of the Governor of the State of Florida (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-82.pdf (last accessed Mar. 15, 2021).
15 Media Statement, CDC, CDC Issues Domestic Travel Advisory for New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut (Mar.
28, 2020) https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s038-travel-advisory.html.
16 Mullery, supra note 12.
17 Exec. Order No. 20-192, Office of the Governor of the State of Florida (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-192.pdf (last accessed Mar. 15, 2021)
18 Jackie Botts, et al., Timeline: California reacts to coronavirus, C AL M ATTERS: C ORONAVIRUS (April 1, 2020,
updated May 13, 2020), https://calmatters.org/health/coronavirus/2020/04/gavin-newsom-coronavirus-updatestimeline/.
19 Michelle A. Jordan, MD, et al., Evidence for Limited Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United States,
January-February 2020, MMWR M ORB. M ORTAL. WKLY REP. 2020; 69:680-684 (DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6922e1, also at https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6922e1.htm).
12
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the first death was thought to be in Washington state on February 28, 2020.20 Travel conditions
on out-of-state visitors were not imposed until November 13, 2020.21 These travel conditions
were put in place approximately eleven months after the first case in January 2020. As such, the
travel conditions would be expected to have only a minimal impact, since the virus was already
circulating in the state. As of May 2021, inter-state travel conditions remain in place in
California for unvaccinated travelers.22
Unlike California, and similar to New York and Florida, Texas reported its first SARSCoV-2 case on March 4, 2020.23 Texas announced travel conditions for visitors from New
Orleans, New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut on March 26, 2020. 24 These travel conditions
came after the virus was present in Texas for approximately one month, and cited guidance from
the CDC, as well as the travel conditions Florida implemented on March 23, 2020.25 Texas lifted
its travel conditions on May 21, 2020.26

20

Paige St. John, Melanie Mason, and Matt Hamilton, The silent, deadly spread of coronavirus in California began
far earlier than first reported, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020 5:00AM PT),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-04-23/morgues-hold-key-to-early-spread-of-coronavirus.
21 Geoff Whitmore, What Are The California Travel Restrictions?, FORBES.COM (Dec. 8, 2020, 2:23PM EST),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/geoffwhitmore/2020/12/08/what-are-the-california -travelrestrictions/?sh=1ffef9b35751, see also Travel Advisory, State of California—Health and Human Services Agency
(Jan. 6, 2021),https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/COVID-19/Travel-Advisory.aspx, Julie Weed,
California Travel Restrictions: What You Need to Know, The New York Times (Dec. 10, 2020, updated Dec. 22,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/travel/california -travel-restrictions-covid.html, Travel restrictions
issued by states in response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, 2020-2021, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Travel_restrictions_issued_by_states_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID19)_pandemic,_2020-2021 (last accessed May 9, 2021).
22 Travel, COVID19.CA.GOV (Last updated Apr. 27, 2021 2:00 PM), https://covid19.ca.gov/travel/ (last accessed
May 7, 2021), see also, State of California—Health and Human Services Agency (April 2, 2021),
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/COVID-19/Travel-Advisory.aspx.
23 DSHS Announces First Case of COVID-19 in Texas, TEXAS H EALTH AND H UMAN SERVICES (Mar. 4, 2020),
https://www.dshs.texas.gov/news/releases/2020/20200304.aspx; see also Texas Executive Orders & Public Health
Disaster Declarations, TEXAS H EALTH AND H UMAN SERVICES,
https://www.dshs.state.tx.us/coronavirus/execorders.aspx (last accessed Feb. 14, 2021).
24 Exec. Order No. GA-11, Office of the Governor of the State of Texas (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA-11_airport_travel_reporting_COVID-19_IMAGE_03-26-2020.pdf
(last accessed Mar. 15, 2021).
25 Id.
26 Governor Abbott Issues Executive Order Terminating Air Travel Restrictions Related to COVID-19 Pandemic,
OFFICE OF THE TEXAS GOVERNOR (May 21, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-issuesexecutive-order-terminating-air-travel-restrictions-related-to-covid-19-pandemic; see also Exec. Order No. GA-24,
Office of the Governor of the State of Texas (May. 21, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA24_termination_of_air_travel_restrictions_COVID-19_IMAGE_05-21-20.pdf (last accessed Mar. 15, 2021).
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Each of these four states took different approaches based on the information and evolving
circumstances. New York and California implemented travel conditions later in the pandemic,
and travel conditions are still in place in California as of May 2021. Florida and Texas
implemented travel conditions early in the pandemic and removed the travel conditions after
only a few months. Part III evaluates in more detail the outcomes for these four states based on
positive cases and COVID-19 related deaths; the pattern of travel conditions does not appear
dispositive to the state COVID-19 death rates.
B.

Legal Framework: Evaluating Constitutionality
Claims challenging travel conditions thus far have relied on the right to travel, found in

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition to this claim, some
scholars have highlighted the potential for a dormant commerce clause claim, challenging state
intrusion which is burdening interstate commerce. It is worth noting that such a claim is unlikely
to succeed based on the current balance of protecting public health versus burdening interstate
commerce. This section evaluates the four main components of a potential legal claim
challenging travel conditions: i) the role of state police powers during a public health emergency;
ii) the right to travel, protected under the Fourteenth Amendment; iii) establishing standing to
bring a claim; and iv) the potential role of a dormant commerce clause claim.
i.

Police Powers
State police powers are located in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. 27 This

amendment gives states the “rights and powers ‘not delegated to the United States.’ States are
thus granted the power to establish and enforce laws protecting the welfare, safety, and health of
the public.”28 For example, states may impose limitations on residents and non-resident visitors

27

Legal Information Institute, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/police_powers (last visited
Mar. 13, 2021).
28 Id.
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as long as they are reasonably and substantially related to protecting the public health. 29
Two historic cases remain relevant to understanding the breadth of state police powers:
Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Board of Health of State of Louisiana and
Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The Supreme Court decided the first case,
Compagnie Francaise, in 1902, reinforcing state police powers to prohibit travelers from
disembarking in New Orleans, which was under quarantine due to an outbreak of disease. 30 The
Supreme Court decided the second case, Jacobson, in 1905. Jacobson reinforced state police
powers by upholding Massachusetts’s mandatory smallpox vaccination statute. 31 While the Court
did recognize that allowances should be made to accommodate those who would be injured by
the vaccine,32 the Court clarified and affirmed a limitation on individual rights, in favor of the
broader interests of the state.33 When assessing the legal justification for the travel conditions
used by states in response to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, these cases remain relevant.
In Compagnie Francaise, the passengers were prohibited from disembarking in multiple
cities within Louisiana.34 This prohibition was implemented because certain locations within
Louisiana were under quarantine orders35 due to an outbreak of yellow fever.36 In assessing the
facts of the case, the Court reiterated: “[t]hat from an early day the power of the states to enact
and enforce quarantine laws for the safety and the protection of the health of their inhabitants has
been recognized by Congress, is beyond question.”37 The Court continued:
the health and quarantine laws of the several states are not repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States, although they affect foreign and domestic
29

Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).
Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Bd. of Health of State of Louisiana , 186 U.S. 380, 397 (1902).
31 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39.
32 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 36.
33 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
34 Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 382.
35 Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 382.
36 Dr. James Finck, Coronavirus quarantine fights not a first for U.S., DAILY JOURNAL ONLINE , (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://dailyjournalonline.com/community/farmington-press/coronavirus-quarantine-fights-not-a-first-for-us/article_4c30f695-aeea-5532-916c-4821670d27b8.html.
37 Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 387.
30
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commerce, as in many cases they necessarily must do in order to be efficacious,
because until Congress has acted under the authority conferred upon it by the
Constitution, such state health and quarantine laws producing such effect on
legitimate interstate commerce are not in conflict with the Constitution. 38
Looking at the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and the measures states have taken, there is no doubt that
the different travel conditions have impacted interstate commerce by discouraging tourist and
business travel. However, as long as the states can show that the measures were taken in order to
protect public health, the measures are likely constitutional.
While Compagnie Francaise involved traveling passengers, Jacobson remains the
reference case for state police powers during public health emergencies. In Jacobson,
Cambridge, Massachusetts was experiencing a smallpox outbreak.39 In response, the board of
health determined that “the public health and safety require the vaccination or revaccination of
all the inhabitants of Cambridge . . . .”40 The Court upheld the Massachusetts vaccine
requirement and created a two-part analysis: 1) the statute must have a real or substantial relation
to public health;41 and 2) the statute must not be a “plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by
the fundamental law . . . .”42 The Court went further and clarified that state police powers can
override individual rights and liberty:
Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which
recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of
his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others. This
court has more than once recognized it as a fundamental principle that ‘persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state; of the perfect right of the
legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general
principles ever can be, made, so far as natural persons are concerned.’ 43

38

Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 391.
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12.
40 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12.
41 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
42 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
43 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26, (citing Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877), (quoting Thorpe v.
Rutland & B.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 150 (1854))).
39
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Therefore, under Compagnie Francaise and Jacobson, the constitutional stage is set with broad
deferential police powers granted to states to protect public health, even if those police powers
impact interstate commerce,44 or the rights of an individual.45
ii.

Right to Travel
While a “right to travel” is not enumerated in the Constitution, this right has been

recognized by the Supreme Court.46 The right to travel is protected through the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,47 is embedded in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, 48
and consists of three components:
[1] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, [2] the right
to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily
present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent
residents, [3] the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.49
With regards to travel conditions, the first two of these components are relevant. 50 “A state law
implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its
primary objective, or when it uses ‘any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of
that right.’”51
In Zemel v. Rusk, a 1965 case involving the Secretary of State’s ability to refuse to
validate passports for travel to Cuba, the Supreme Court stated that the freedom to travel “does
not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilence cannot be quarantined when it can be
demonstrated that unlimited travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with the

44

Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 391.
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26, (citing Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877), (quoting Thorpe v.
Rutland & B.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 150 (1854))).
46 Carmichael v. Ige, 470 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1145 (D. Haw. 2020) (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999)
(citation omitted)).
47 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999).
48 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 498.
49 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
50 Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d, at 1145.
51 Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1145, (citing Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (citations omitted)).
45
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safety and welfare of the area or the Nation as a whole.” 52 This suggest that “any infringements
on the right to travel [which] are not overly broad and are necessary to serve a compelling state
interest--such as combatting the coronavirus pandemic--[] should withstand court challenges to
COVID-19 restrictions on travel.”53
Since the travel conditions apply to everyone, with no exception based on a suspect class
such as race or gender, it is unlikely that they violate equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Discriminating against “travelers” vs “non-travelers” is not suspect; “[t]he Supreme
Court has ‘repeatedly held that “a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor
proceeding along suspect lines ... cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a
rational relationship between disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental
purpose.”’”54
iii.

Standing
In addition to the deference granted to state police powers under Compagnie Francaise

and Jacobson, plaintiffs struggle to establish standing when challenging the travel conditions.
Standing to sue in federal court requires that plaintiffs show: 1) “injury in fact” that is “concrete
and particularized” and “actual or imminent”;55 2) the injury must be fairly traceable to the
defendant's conduct;56 and 3) the injury can be redressed through adjudication.” 57 When
challenging travel conditions, plaintiffs may struggle to demonstrate an “injur[y] they purport to

52

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1965); see also Jeff Thaler, The Next Surges Are Here: What Can American
Governments Lawfully Do in Response to the Ongoing Covid-19 Pandemic?, 42 M ITCHELL H AMLINE L.J. PUB.
POL'Y & PRAC. 165, 189 (2020).
53 Jeff Thaler, The Next Surges Are Here: What Can American Governments Lawfully Do in Response to the
Ongoing Covid-19 Pandemic?, 42 M ITCHELL H AMLINE L.J. PUB. POL'Y & PRAC. 165, 189 (2020), (citing Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1965)).
54 Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1149 (citing Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124,
127–28 (1999)).
55 Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1141, (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, (1992)).
56 Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1141, (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, (1992)).
57 Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1141, (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, (1992)).
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have suffered or are in imminent danger of sustaining as a result of the [travel condition].”58 The
“threat” of an injury is also hard to establish concretely. With rare exception, such as the Outer
Banks of North Carolina, which are reached by only one road which could be patrolled,59 states
have not barred travel; they have imposed travel conditions on travelers arriving from out-ofstate.60 Therefore travelers do not face an injury since they are not being refused entry to a state.
Travelers can choose to comply with the conditions or choose not to travel. Since travelers have
a choice, even if it may seem like a “false choice”, it is difficult to establish an injury and
therefore difficult to show standing to proceed with a claim. For example, in a case decided by
the Second Circuit in 2020 regarding measures implemented by Connecticut in response to the
2014 Ebola outbreak, the court determined that the plaintiffs did not have standing.61 The court
said that “the notion that Appellants must undertake reasonable efforts in the present to avert
injury in the future is also speculative, and Appellants lack standing to pursue any of their
prospective claims.”62
These examples serve as guidelines to states for how to structure travel conditions to
avoid violating the Constitution. They also warn plaintiffs of the difficulties in succeeding with a
case challenging the travel conditions. While standing is hard to establish, a plaintiff could try to
establish standing if they can show injury based on lost income due to travel which was
cancelled due to the travel conditions. However, while this may help to show injury and establish
standing, the plaintiff should be on notice that the court analysis under Compagnie Francaise
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Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Tyree, Visitors banned from Outer Banks amid coronavirus outbreak, ABC13 NEWS (Mar.
17, 2020), https://wset.com/news/coronavirus/visitors-banned-from-outer-banks-amid-coronavirus-outbreak (some
towns did bar visitors).
60 See, e.g., Axelson, supra note 3; Tampone, supra note 4; Botts, supra note 18; Whitmore, supra note 21, see also
Travel Advisory, State of California—Health and Human Services Agency (Jan. 6,
2021),https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/COVID-19/Travel-Advisory.aspx, Julie Weed,
California Travel Restrictions: What You Need to Know, The New York Times (Dec. 10, 2020, updated Dec. 22,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/travel/california -travel-restrictions-covid.html.
61 Liberian Cmty. Ass'n of Connecticut v. Lamont, 970 F.3d 174, 185 (2d Cir. 2020).
62 Liberian Cmty., 970 F.3d at 185.
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and Jacobson is deferential to the state’s use of police powers in a public health emergency.
iv.

Dormant Commerce Clause
While it has not yet been used during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, one option available to

“check” state powers regarding travel conditions could be through a dormant commerce clause
claim. This means that even in the absence of Congressional action, if states discriminate or
unduly burden interstate commerce, this could represent a state-overreach into Congress’s duties
within the Commerce Clause.63 The undue burden test performs a balancing of the interests: the
state justification of the action, such as protecting public health, versus the impact on interstate
commerce.64 To date, a challenge using the dormant commerce clause would likely not succeed
based on the strength of the public health argument. 65 “At least so long as present circumstances
persist, with lives at stake through the flatten-the-curve imperative, it is difficult to imagine a
court tipping the balance in favor of striking down such measures.” 66
C.

Applying the Legal Framework
Two cases provide examples of how the courts applied the legal framework to challenges

to state travel conditions during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. The first case is Bayley’s
Campground, Inc., v. Mills, which applied strict scrutiny review. Bayley’s Campground was first
heard by the District Court of Maine in May 2020,67 and later by the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in January 2021. The second case, Carmichael v. Ige, applied the Jacobson two-part test
63

Legal Information Institute, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause (last
visited Mar. 13, 2021), see also Thaler, supra note 53 at 193-94 (discussing possible dormant commerce clause
claims).
64 Thaler, supra note 53 at 193 (citing Robert Chesney, Can the Federal Government Override State Government
Rules on Social Distancing to Promote the Economy, LAWFARE (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-federal-government-override-state-government-rules-social-distancing-promoteeconomy).
65 Id. (citing Robert Chesney, Can the Federal Government Override State Government Rules on Social Distancing
to Promote the Economy, LAWFARE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-federal-governmentoverride-state-government-rules-social-distancing-promote-economy).
66 Id. (citing Robert Chesney, Can the Federal Government Override State Government Rules on Social Distancing
to Promote the Economy, LAWFARE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-federal-governmentoverride-state-government-rules-social-distancing-promote-economy).
67 Bayley's Campground Inc. v. Mills, 463 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D. Me. 2020).
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and was decided by the District Court of Hawai'i in July 2020. This section evaluates these two
cases, and assesses which standard of review the courts applied, as well as each of the items from
the legal framework: police powers; right to travel; and standing.
i.

Bayley’s Campground, Inc. v. Mills
In Bayley’s Campground the Governor of Maine made an executive order in April 2020

creating a fourteen-day quarantine requirement for visitors entering Maine. 68 The plaintiffs were
two New Hampshire residents, and one Maine resident. 69 The plaintiffs claimed that the
executive order:
‘practically’ prevented the three individual plaintiffs from traveling between Maine
and New Hampshire ‘to recreate, associate with friends, visit businesses, and
simply take trips.’ The complaint also alleged that the requirement caused
‘economic injury’ to the corporate plaintiffs due to ‘a substantial number of
cancellations by out-of-state campers who [we]re unable or unwilling to selfquarantine for 14[ ] days upon their arrival to Maine.’70
The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the executive order, but the
district court denied their motion.71 The district court found that the “self-quarantine requirement
implicated the federal constitutional right to interstate travel and was subject to strict scrutiny in
consequence.”72 Though the executive order was later rescinded, the First Circuit determined that
the case was not moot, because the Governor could reimpose strict travel conditions. 73 However,
the First Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction after finding that
the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits because the “interests in ‘protecting Maine’s
population from further spread of the COVID-19 virus and preventing Maine’s health care
system from being overwhelmed’ by those infected with it are ‘compelling state interests.’” 74
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Bayley's Campground, Inc. v. Mills, 985 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 2021).
Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 155.
70 Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 156.
71 Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 155.
72 Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 155, (citing Bayley’s Campground, Inc. v., Mills, 463 F. Supp. 3d 22, 3135 (D. Me. 2020)).
73 Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 157.
74 Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 159.
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The First Circuit upheld the Maine district court’s application of strict scrutiny because
the travel condition burdened “the federal constitutional right to interstate travel . . . .” 75 To
succeed the Governor of Maine had to show that the travel conditions were “the least restrictive
means of serving a compelling governmental interest.” 76 The First Circuit assumed that the
district court was correct in subjecting the quarantine requirement to strict scrutiny.77 The
primary question for the court “concern[ed] the strength of the support in the record for the
Governor's further assertion that ‘there were no other effective less-restrictive alternative[ ]’
means of serving Maine's compelling interests at the time that EO 34's self-quarantine
requirement was in place.”78 The First Circuit upheld the primary findings of the district court
because:
1) the coronavirus is easily transmissible and unusually deadly;79
2) the virus has an incubation period of fourteen days, and someone could be highly
contagious but asymptomatic;80
3) there was no vaccine or effective treatment at the beginning of the pandemic;81
and
4) slowing the spread was critical for Maine, based on the historic summer tourist
influx versus the hospital facilities available. 82
Neither the district court nor the First Circuit analyzed standing in detail. The district
court did not evaluate standing because the “resolution of this motion does not rise or fall on that
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Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 155.
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Time of Covid-19 the Role of A Lawyer Is Vigilance, 83 TEX. B.J. 462, 463 (2020).
77 Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 159.
78 Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 159.
79 Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 160-61.
80 Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 160-61.
81 Bayley's Campground, Inc., 985 F.3d at 160-61.
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question . . .”83 The First Circuit noted only that “[t]here is no problem with our reaching the
merits based on any concern about a lack of Article III standing on the part of the plaintiffs,
because the individual plaintiffs plainly have suffered an injury-in-fact.”84 The opinion leaves the
question open of whether the same result would occur now that multiple vaccines are available,
and treatments are better understood.
ii.

Carmichael v. Ige
Carmichael also challenged state travel conditions implemented in response to the

SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. In Carmichael the plaintiffs were: 1) California residents with a
condominium in Hawai'i; 2) a Hawai'i resident with family in the continental United States; and
3) a Nevada resident with properties in Hawai'i.85 Ige, the governor of Hawai'i, issued an
Emergency Proclamation order on March 21, 2020, which “imposed a 14-day quarantine,
effective March 26, 2020, applying to all persons entering Hawai'i, both residents and nonresidents alike, with a few exceptions related to emergency and critical infrastructure
functions.”86 These travel conditions evolved during 2020, eventually allowing travelers to
“avoid quarantine by supplying a negative COVID-19 test obtained within 72 hours of arrival in
Hawai'i.”87 The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 88
The court determined that the Fifth Amendment claim was likely erroneous, 89 and focused on the
Fourteenth Amendment claims,90 as well as whether the plaintiffs had standing.91
The standard of review the court used in Carmichael was the Jacobson two-part test. In
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85 Carmichael v. Ige, 470 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (D. Haw. 2020).
86 Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1139, (citing Opp'n, Ex. C, ECF No. 34-2 at 1) (emphasis in original).
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No. 33-5 ¶ 8).
88 Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1139.
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84

16

assessing whether the travel conditions had a real or substantial relation to public health, the
court determined that the:
self-quarantine orders were designed to prevent the importation and intrastate
spread of COVID-19 and that restrictions on non-essential businesses are necessary
to maintain social distancing and stem the spread of community transmission.
Defendant successfully demonstrates that his Emergency Proclamations have a real
or substantial relation to the public health crisis caused by the COVID-19
pandemic.92
The court then assessed whether the travel conditions were “in palpable conflict with the
Constitution.”93 “The Court concluded they [were] not, whether under traditional levels of
scrutiny or Jacobson’s highly deferential standard.”94 The court upheld the travel conditions
based on the two-step Jacobson analysis. The court clarified that, “based on the record presently
before it, the Court [found] that the quarantine survives strict scrutiny and Plaintiffs cannot at
this time establish a likelihood of success or raise a serious question going to the merits of their
right to travel claim.”95
Based on this analysis, the Carmichael court also concluded that Hawai'i’s travel
conditions did not violate the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to travel “whether under
traditional levels of scrutiny or Jacobson’s highly deferential standard.”96 “[T]he Hawai'i court
cited to--and agreed with--the Maine court in Bayley’s Campground Inc., v. Mills that there were
no less restrictive means for the Governor to attempt to protect the public from a rise in COVID19 cases.”97 The court in Carmichael found that a quarantine for travelers arriving from another
state did not violate the two primary components of the right to travel98 :
as individuals from other states may freely travel to Hawai'i; they must simply
92
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94 Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1144-45.
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comply with the quarantine, a requirement equally applicable to Hawai'i resident.
This limited restriction (not ban) is a reasonable one. We are in the middle of a
pandemic, and even Plaintiffs’ counsel voluntarily acknowledged at the hearing
that the COVID-19 crisis is serious.99
The court concluded that “[w]hile not its intended purpose, the quarantine appears to have some
deterrent effect, as evidenced by the depressed visitor numbers. But any deterrent effect the
quarantine may have on Plaintiffs’ travel to Hawai'i does not amount to a violation of their right
to travel.”100 Since travel conditions, even those which impose fourteen-day quarantine periods,
are not recognized as travel bans, the conditions likely do not constitute a violation of an
individual’s constitutional right to travel.101
While the court did not reach the standing issue in Carmichael,102 it did provide some
insight on how the analysis might proceed:
Plaintiffs argue that the deprivation of their constitutional rights causes them
irreparable harm, with each day bringing further injury, and no damages can
adequately compensate them for their loss of time and freedom. As discussed
above, Plaintiffs’ declarations explain only why they have elected not to travel to
Hawai'i due to the potential issues that could arise from having to quarantine, or
claim, without supporting explanation or evidence, that undergoing the quarantine
is impossible. These cursory and speculative assertions insufficiently demonstrate
immediate threatened injury and considering Plaintiffs’ failure to show a likelihood
of success on the merits, their constitutional claims are too attenuated to establish
irreparable harm.103
Even with a strict review standard, plaintiffs are failing in their challenges to the
travel conditions, based on the compelling government interest in protecting public health
and hospital capacity. Additionally, the two-part analysis of Jacobson closely resembles a
rational basis test, deferring to state police powers as long as: 1) there is a real or substantial
relation to public health;104 and 2) the statute is not a “plain, palpable invasion of rights
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secured by the fundamental law . . . .”105 Based on these two cases, one sees that public
interest during a public health emergency can easily outweigh the rights of individuals, and
travel conditions will likely survive the legal challenges brought.
PART II: PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
This Part II evaluates the reasons and implementation strategies for travel conditions, the
information available regarding the costs and benefits, and the information available from
institutions such as the WHO regarding travel conditions. Since the SARS-CoV-2 virus can be
spread by asymptomatic individuals, it is not conducive to travel conditions. Additionally, there
is not much research into the costs of travel conditions, so a true cost versus benefit analysis
cannot be performed. Based on this, travel conditions in the case of the SARS-CoV-2 virus are
likely not a recommended public health response.
A.

Travel Conditions: Reasons and Implementation
The effectiveness of measures such as travel conditions in combatting disease spread

depends on how strictly the measure is enforced.106 Public health measures restricting movement
are not new. Restrictions such as cordons sanitaires have been used to combat disease since the
time of the plague.107 A cordon sanitaire is barrier segregating the sick individuals from the
healthy individuals in a community.108 Individuals behind the cordon sanitaire cannot enter the
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Ana LP Mateus et al, Effectiveness of travel restrictions in the rapid containment of human influenza: a
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accessed Mar. 17, 2021); see also, Rachel Kaplan Hoffman, M.D., M.S.Ed., and Keith Hoffman, J.D., Ethical
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“free” area without prior approval.109 However, the success of a cordon sanitaire depends on the
ability to have a clear line of containment, separating the sick from the healthy.110
Extrapolating the cordon sanitaire into a method of isolating individual states from their
neighbors does not work as well. The logistics of implementing a firm border between each of
the states is difficult, to the point of being impossible, with the exception of island-states such as
Hawai'i. In the continental United States, there are too many entry points between the states to
patrol. Travel conditions depend on voluntary compliance, with the possible exception of plane
travel, which could be more closely overseen to ensure passengers have registered per a state
requirement. However, without a full military state implementation and enforcement, there is a
risk that visitors to states will not follow the travel conditions imposed by the host-state.
Additionally, the effectiveness of a travel condition typically depends on early
identification of the illness.111 SARS-CoV-2 does not lend itself to these types of travel
conditions, because the virus can be spread by asymptomatic carriers, and individuals can be
contagious during the incubation period, approximately fourteen days,112 before an individual
may show symptoms of COVID-19.113 States did not announce travel conditions until March
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2020,114 at which point SARS-CoV-2 was already present in the United States for more than one
month.115
Further hampering the effectiveness of travel conditions was the delay in testing roll-out
across the United States.116 These delays made it difficult to get ahead of the virus and
proactively test and identify asymptomatic individuals.117 Once testing was available in the
United States, it was initially only available to individuals with known exposure risks. 118 Even
though examples of transmission unrelated to international travel had already occurred,119
individuals without a known exposure could not access testing, and instead could potentially
continue circulating and spreading the virus120 .
Based on the characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 incubation and transmission, as well as the
interconnected nature of the continental United States, it is unlikely that travel conditions were
effective at stopping the circulation of the virus.
B.

Travel Conditions: Costs vs Benefits
It is difficult to estimate the costs associated directly with the travel conditions. While the

economic impact of past pandemics such as H1N1 in 2009 has been assessed, this did not
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include assessments specific to the travel conditions, but rather focused on medical costs, costs
associated with pandemic mitigation, etc.121 The economic impact of pandemic influenza in the
United States was estimated at “US$71.3 to $166.5 billion, excluding disruptions to commerce
and society.”122 A study of the impact of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic in South Korea
found that the “annual socioeconomic costs . . . were US$1.09 billion (0.14% of the national
GDP).”123 However while there is some literature regarding the economic impacts of pandemic
influenza, it is generally recognized that “there is a lack of economic evaluation for
preparedness, prevention, trade and travel restrictions, hygiene recommendations, and human-toanimal transmission interventions.”124
In addition to the lack of information regarding the costs of travel conditions, the
documented benefits of travel conditions are limited at best. Available information tends to
analyze international travel restrictions, not travel conditions within one country. In one study
regarding the benefits of international air travel restrictions on pandemic flu, the authors found
that, “[c]onsistent with previous work . . . , our study shows that international travel restrictions
per se do not provide an effective way to contain the epidemic.”125 In a 2014 bulletin following
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza, the authors performed a systematic review of international
and internal travel restrictions and concluded that “[a]s quantitative assessment of the
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effectiveness of travel restrictions in pandemic situations tends to be more challenging, there are
scarce data on this topic.”126
Without a full understanding of the costs of travel conditions, and a lack of information
showing the benefits of travel conditions, it is difficult to perform a full balancing assessment of
the costs versus benefits of these measures for limiting disease spread. Based on this dearth of
information, it was likely not prudent to impose such a broad restriction as part of managing
SARS-CoV-2 spread, based on the attributes of the virus.
C.

General Consensus: Travel Conditions Are Not Preferred
Since international travel restrictions “would hamper global travel and trade, such

restrictions are not recommended by WHO once the global spread of pandemic influenza is
established.”127 Based on the timeline of the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, by the time states
implemented travel conditions, not only was global spread of the virus established, but spread
within the United States was already present.128
Additionally, specific to the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, the WHO did not recommend
international travel restrictions because the information available at the beginning of the
pandemic did not support them:
First, there is no reason for measures that unnecessarily interfere with international
travel and trade. WHO doesn’t recommend limiting trade and movement. We call
on all countries to implement decisions that are evidence-based and consistent.
WHO stands ready to provide advice to any country that is considering which
measures to take.129
While this guidance targeted international travel, the same logic would likely apply for internal
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travel conditions because the information available likely did not support implementing state
travel conditions. Based on the characteristics of SARS-CoV-2, the lack of information to
perform a complete cost versus benefit assessment, and the delay in widely available testing of
individuals, travel conditions were not likely effective measures against SARS-CoV-2.
Additionally, the WHO’s guidance against international travel restrictions should have served as
a point of reference as states considered the use of this tool during the public health emergency.
Travel restrictions hamper trade and are not recommended once a global pandemic is
established.130 By the time states implemented travel conditions in March 2020 or later, SARSCoV-2 was already present and spreading via symptomatic and asymptomatic carriers.131
Implementing a travel condition at that point is akin to closing the barn door after the horse has
escaped – it is too late to be effective.
PART III: COMPARISONS OF STATE APPROACHES
This Part III assesses the approaches and results of four different states with regards to
travel conditions. Florida and New York were compared together, and California and Texas were
compared together. The states were compared by looking at COVID-19 case counts and death
rates. The results do not show a significant difference: the use of travel conditions was not
dispositive in predicting whether the state fared better or not. Based on this, the travel conditions
likely did not have a measurable benefit for state outcomes, even though travel conditions are
still in place in California. A more detailed epidemiological analysis would be required to
determine what role the travel conditions may have had in the infection and death rates.
A.

Comparison: New York and Florida
Throughout the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, New York and Florida took different measures

to respond to the public health situation. New York did not implement travel conditions until
130
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June 2020, and these conditions were not lifted until April 10, 2021.132 By comparison, Florida
implemented travel conditions in March 2020; however, these conditions were removed by
August 2020. A comparison of the death rates in this section shows that Florida has not done
worse as a result of lifting its travel conditions. Instead, Florida seems to be out-performing New
York with a lower death rate, while remaining open without travel conditions.
i.

Summary of State Death Rates
New York and Florida have similar state populations. Florida has slightly more residents

at 21,477,737, with 20.9% of individuals aged 65 or older, a known risk factor for COVID-19
mortality.133 Florida’s population per square mile (2010) was 350.6. 134 New York has 19,453,561
residents, 16.9% of which are aged 65 or older. 135 New York’s population per square mile (2010)
was higher than Florida’s at 411.2.136 New York and Florida have similar population sizes, with
some differences in population density as well as elderly population, yet each state took different
approaches to the use of travel conditions to manage the public health risk posed by SARS-CoV2. A comparison of the death rates shows that the presence or absence of travel conditions does
not necessarily determine the outcome.
The CDC tracks death rates for each state, splitting New York into two groups, New
York (excluding New York City), and New York City. Measured as deaths per 100,000, as of
May 7, 2021, New York’s death rate was 176; New York City’s was 390.137 Florida’s death rate
was 165.138 The New York Times publishes charts of the reported cases and reported deaths per
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state.139 For New York we see the first peak in March and April 2020, when it was the epicenter
of COVID-19 cases in the United States, as well as a trough which begins in May 2020 and
continues until November 2020. The trough begins well before the travel conditions were
announced on June 24, 2020. The second peak in November 2020 occurred while the travel
conditions were still in place. Florida saw a first peak of cases around July 2020, and a trough
which began in September 2020 and continued until November 2020.
In the second peak New York’s death rate was similar to that of Florida, despite having
strong travel conditions in place. New York’s peak death rate during the second peak was
roughly 198 on January 20. This was slightly higher than Florida’s peak death rate during the
second peak, which was roughly 185 on January 28. See Figures 1 and 2 below:
Figure 1: New York140
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Figure 2: Florida141

ii.

Were the Travel Conditions Effective?
Comparing the results of New York and Florida, states with similar populations but

different approaches to travel conditions, the results likely do not support the use of travel
conditions. Additional epidemiological research is needed to confirm the role travel conditions
did or did not play in reducing case counts and death rates. New York implemented its travel
conditions on June 24, 2020, when its case counts and death rates were already dramatically
decreased from its first peak, and kept travel conditions in place through April 10, 2021. By the
summer of 2020 New York had already faced and overcome the first peak with no travel
conditions in place. While New York did experience a second peak around the winter holiday
season, this was similar to the second peak seen in Florida, a state without travel conditions.
While Florida has a slightly lower population density compared to New York, Florida has more
elderly residents, who are particularly vulnerable to adverse COVID-19 outcomes. This suggests
that the use of strict travel conditions is likely not dispositive to predicting state outcomes. While
one can argue that the situation in New York could have been worse during the second peak
without the travel conditions, one can also argue that there are a variety of reasons the travel
conditions were not, and will not, be effective. This is potentially due to “pandemic fatigue”142
141

Tracking Coronavirus in Florida: Latest Map and Case Count, THE NEW YORK TIMES: THE CORONAVIRUS
OUTBREAK (last updated May 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/florida -covid-cases.html (last
accessed May 7, 2021).
142 See, e.g., U.S. Surgeon General Blames ‘Pandemic Fatigue’ For Recent COVID-19 Surge, NPR: THE
CORONAVIRUS CRISIS (Nov. 14, 2020, 6:38PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-

27

and a lack of adherence to the travel conditions, as well as a lack of resources to strictly enforce
the travel conditions, rendering them moot.
B.

Comparison: California and Texas
During the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, California and Texas also took different measures to

respond to the public health situation. California did not implement travel conditions until
November 2020, and those conditions are still in place for unvaccinated travelers as of May
2021.143 By comparison, Texas implemented travel conditions in March 2020, but removed those
conditions by May 2020. A comparison of the death rates for these states shows that Texas has
not done worse as a result of lifting its travel conditions. The measures of cases and deaths are
similar between Texas and California, even though California still has travel conditions in place.
i.

Summary of State Death Rates
California has a large population, at 39,512,223, 14.8% of whom are aged 65 or older.144

California’s population per square mile (2010) was 239.1. 145 By contrast, Texas’s population is
28,995, 881, of whom 12.9% are 65 or older.146 Texas’s population per square mile (2010) was
96.3.147 Based on its size and population, is difficult to find a state which is comparable to
California, however Texas is the closest approximation.148 California and Texas took different
approaches to the use of travel conditions to manage the public health risk posed by SARS-CoV2. A comparison of the death rates shows that the presence or absence of travel conditions did
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not necessarily determine the outcome.
Measured as deaths per 100,000, California’s death rate was 154, as of May 7, 2021.149
Texas’s death rate was 170.150 According to the New York Times chart of COVID-19 disease
spread and impact, California did not have a large first peak before the summer, as was seen in
New York and Florida. Rather there is a small “hump” of cases and deaths in the summer months
of July and August 2020, and then a peak is seen approximately mid-way through November
2020. Ironically this peak corresponds roughly with the implementation of the travel conditions
imposed November 13, 2020. This shows that the travel conditions likely were not a direct result
of a peak, which had not yet happened, and the use of travel conditions did not avoid the winter
peak which was also seen in New York and Florida. Indeed, during the winter peak in California,
the death rate was more than double what was seen in New York, which also had strict travel
conditions, as well as Florida, which had no travel conditions.
Texas was also spared a first peak in the spring of 2020, and did not see a “hump” of
cases and deaths until that summer, at which point the travel conditions were already lifted.
Texas did see the winter peak, which was also present in California, New York, and Florida.
Notably, while Texas did see this winter peak, the death rate during this time was lower than that
seen in California. Texas’s death rate during the winter peak reached a high of roughly 342 on
January 27, while California’s peak was roughly 561, also on January 27. See Figures 3 and 4
below:
Figure 3: California151
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Figure 4: Texas152

ii.

Were the Travel Conditions Effective?
Comparing the results of California and Texas highlights the different approaches taken

regarding the use of travel conditions to manage a public health situation. California did not
implement any travel conditions until just prior to the United States’ Thanksgiving holiday
period, in mid-November 2020. Prior to that, California had not seen a peak of COVID-19 cases.
California then experienced a winter peak, which was also seen in Texas, a state which removed
its travel conditions in May 2020. While both states experienced a winter peak, the death rate in
California was higher than that in Texas, which had no travel conditions at the time. As of May
2021, California’s travel conditions have not been lifted for unvaccinated travelers. 153
California’s case rate and death rate increased dramatically starting in November, even
though California implemented strict travel conditions. Some of this could be attributed to the
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holiday season; in addition to strict inter-state travel conditions, California also implemented
local requirements to reduce exposure across households. This could indicate that 1) the spike
seen in December and January would have been worse without the travel conditions, or 2) the
travel conditions were not followed to the extent needed to keep the rate flat. Texas did not see a
jump in cases until the summer timeframe, and death rates did not spike until July 7th . Cases and
death rates came down during the fall, September through November, before spiking again in
December and January.
Texas and California both saw the same spike in December and January, however Texas
did not have any travel conditions while California had implemented conditions right before the
Thanksgiving holiday. While one could hypothesize that the travel conditions may have helped
California to reduce the effect of the spike, other states also saw the same holiday spike,
including New York and Florida from Section A. This indicates that the use of travel conditions
may not be dispositive as to whether states saw spikes in the November 2020 through December
2020 timeframe. This may also indicate that residents were experiencing “pandemic fatigue” and
were no longer following the guidance of the travel conditions, thereby diminishing their
effectiveness. The Economist also noted this similarity in results between Texas and California
in the face of contrasting approaches.154 The article quotes Ken Miller of Claremont McKenna
college: “[p]eople in California are frustrated because they feel like they are experiencing the
worst of both worlds.”155
CONCLUSION
In an address to the Federalist Society in November 2020, Justice Alito stated that “[t]he
pandemic has resulted in previously unimaginable restrictions on individual liberty. . . . We have

154

Life, liberty; California v Texas v covid-19, THE ECONOMIST 6 Feb. 2021: 19(US). BUSINESS I NSIGHTS: GLOBAL.
Web. 1 Mar. 2021.
155 Id. (quoting Ken Miller, Claremont McKenna college, author of Texas vs California).

31

never before seen restrictions as severe, extensive, and prolonged as those experienced for most
of 2020.”156 He continued that “[i]t [Jacobson] did not involve sweeping restrictions imposed
across the country for an extended period. And it does not mean that whenever there is an
emergency, executive officials have unlimited, unreviewable discretion.” 157 With regards to
broad executive powers and deference to state police powers, Justice Alito reminded us that:
whatever one may think about the COVID restrictions, we surely don’t want them to
become a recurring feature after the pandemic has passed. All sorts of things can be called
an “emergency” or “disaster of major proportions.” Simply slapping on that label cannot
provide the ground for abrogating our most fundamental rights. And whenever
fundamental rights are restricted, the Supreme Court, and other courts, cannot close their
eyes.158
While challenges to state travel conditions were not successful, the examples seen were raised
early in the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, when much was still unknown about this “‘novel severe
acute respiratory illness’ with ‘no known cure, no effective treatment, and no vaccine.’”159 As of
this paper’s submission in May 2021, we are more than twelve months from when the pandemic
began, more is known about the virus’s transmission and treatment, and there are currently three
vaccines authorized under the FDA’s Emergency Use Authorization.160
Measures which were accepted by courts in 2020 may no longer be accepted based on
our current knowledge of the virus and methods for treating and vaccinating against it. Now that
we know more regarding the risk factors, treatment, and have multiple vaccines available, courts
may no longer show such broad deference to governors exercising state police powers to manage
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the coronavirus risk.161 “Government imposed restrictions that survive strict-scrutiny analysis
today will likely not meet this standard in the future. Even as states loosen restrictions, these
measures may return with the ebb and flow of coronavirus transmission.” 162
State-based travel conditions are likely constitutional due deference afforded to state
police powers, especially during a public health emergency. However, in the states assessed, the
travel conditions likely did not lead to different public health outcomes when compared to states
without travel conditions. Travel conditions are likely ineffective because SARS-CoV-2 does not
lend itself to early detection. Further epidemiological research should be conducted to determine
what role, if any, travel conditions played in reducing case counts and death rates.
Though the travel conditions were likely ineffective, entities such as the CDC and WHO
can continue to publish information regarding disease incidence and death rates based on
geography, to inform and possibly dissuade travelers.163 Travelers who are determined to take
the risk armed with such knowledge likely would not be deterred by travel conditions.
Based on their likely ineffectiveness as a public health response to the SARS-CoV-2
pandemic, travel conditions should be lifted, and information should continue to be published
regarding illness rates for traveler awareness.
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